The Fastest Way to Take Over the Caribbean with AI

Opinion

The Caribbean could surrender control over important decisions while each country celebrates its own national AI strategy. If we negotiate separately, test separately and keep failures to ourselves, we make it easier for outside interests to shape the systems on which our citizens depend. National strategies need to work together.

I am concerned about a form of dependence we could build into our economies ourselves. A country can write its own strategy while relying on tools whose priorities, operating rules and continued availability it cannot meaningfully influence. Put those tools inside public services and essential businesses, then give them authority to act, and the consequences extend well beyond a software purchase.

A national strategy can still build external dependence

A strategy needs to explain who will retain control after the technology arrives. That includes who can inspect an AI-assisted decision, change the supplier, recover the organisation's records and keep a service operating during an interruption.

Consider a hypothetical government assistant used to explain benefits or business registration. If its approved sources, user history and operating procedures cannot move to another service, replacing it could become expensive and disruptive. A ministry may retain formal responsibility while losing the practical ability to change how the service works.

We could find ourselves colonised again through systems we adopted voluntarily. That is the concern behind my use of agentic colonialism: outside systems could acquire influence over local choices because institutions become dependent on them.

Global tools can bring expertise and useful capabilities to the Caribbean. We should use them where they serve our needs. But a national strategy should also specify which capabilities we need to retain, which dependencies we are willing to accept and how we will leave an arrangement that no longer serves us.

When neighbouring countries face a similar supplier or vulnerability, examining those questions together could improve the evidence available to each buyer. Separate flags should not require separate discovery of the same failure.

A useful tool can serve different interests

An AI system can work as designed and still give an unsuitable answer to a Caribbean institution. A supplier may prioritise a broad international market. A government department may prioritise its service targets. A citizen may need an explanation, an exception or a route to challenge a decision. Those interests can diverge without anyone organising a covert attack.

A hypothetical assistant rewarded mainly for closing enquiries could appear efficient while leaving difficult cases unresolved. If officials measure only completion, they may approve a system that shifts the burden onto people least able to contest it.

This is why AI alignment matters at the national level. We need to define whose interests the system should serve, which trade-offs are unacceptable and who can overturn its recommendations.

Foreign ownership alone does not establish that a product acts for a foreign government. Claims about state direction require evidence about the particular system and activity. Procurement should nevertheless examine ownership, relevant jurisdictions, subcontractors, access arrangements and the circumstances in which the supplier can change or withdraw the service.

The same scrutiny belongs in contracts with local suppliers. A Caribbean address does not demonstrate secure engineering or accountability. We need evidence about behaviour and enforceable rights.

Agents make permission a regional security concern

AI agents can use connected tools to carry out tasks. Their authority may include reading files, sending messages or making changes to a system. The risk therefore depends partly on what the agent can do after an unsuitable instruction reaches it.

NIST describes agent hijacking as an attack in which instructions hidden in material such as a file, email or website redirect an agent from its authorised task. Its controlled evaluations examined harmful actions including data theft and phishing. These tests establish a credible failure mechanism; they do not estimate the frequency of such attacks in Caribbean institutions. NIST, January 2025; updated December 2025.

Imagine, as a hypothetical example, a public-service agent reading an external document that asks it to send internal records elsewhere. The document should have no authority to grant that access. The organisation needs technical restrictions that enforce the boundary even when the agent follows the wrong instruction.

Criminals or a state-backed actor could place those malicious instructions in otherwise ordinary material. A separate problem arises when an agent pursues an approved objective too narrowly and causes harm without an attacker. Both require attention, but they need different evidence and controls.

If a country discovers a failure in a system used elsewhere in the region, the lesson should reach the other operators quickly. That requires an agreed reporting route, named contacts and rules for sharing technical findings without exposing citizens' records.

Regional cooperation already has a foundation

The Caribbean is not starting from zero. UNESCO reported in July 2026 that members of CARICOM's COTED-ICT endorsed its Caribbean AI Policy Roadmap, launched in 2024. That provides a regional basis for collaboration rather than an argument for replacing national priorities. UNESCO, 7 July 2026.

In the same report, Grenada's Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell said: “We must act collectively and strategically to ensure that our region is not left at the margins.”

The Caribbean Telecommunications Union's December 2025 interim report proposed harmonised governance, procurement and audit standards, alongside stronger regional capacity. CTU, 13 December 2025.

The next task is to turn shared principles into routines that a procurement officer, regulator or service manager can use. Countries can retain their laws and policy choices while comparing supplier terms, sharing test methods and coordinating responses to common failures.

Cooperation also needs safeguards. A shared platform could create its own concentration of power or become a single point of failure. Smaller countries need a meaningful voice, sensitive records need controlled access, and participating institutions need a workable route to withdraw.

What governments and regional institutions should do next

I recommend beginning with existing Caribbean institutions and a bounded joint exercise, with named owners and published findings.

Map one consequential service in each participating country within 30 days. The responsible ministry or regulator should identify the model provider, hosting arrangements, data access, connected tools and fallback. Record what remains unknown and who must obtain the answer. The deadline is a proposed starting target.

Agree a common supplier disclosure schedule. Public procurement teams should request comparable information on access, retention, subcontractors, changes to the service and exit arrangements. Shared questions would make differences easier to examine without requiring identical national contracts.

Test one common failure scenario within 90 days. Participating security teams could use synthetic records to test an unauthorised disclosure request and rehearse suspending the agent's access. Publish what was tested, which actions were blocked and what requires repair. One successful exercise would not establish general safety.

Create a protected regional incident-sharing route. National cyber teams and relevant regulators should agree what information to share, who receives it and how to protect confidential material. Begin with failure mechanisms and mitigations; avoid building a regional collection of personal records.

Fund Caribbean capability to question and replace suppliers. Universities, technical teams and professional bodies should help develop local evaluation skills, language tests and recovery procedures. Measure progress through the work institutions can inspect and operate themselves.

My concern is that we could adopt AI quickly while becoming less able to choose how it serves us. Every national strategy should therefore answer a practical question: if this system stops serving our people, who has the authority, knowledge and means to change it? Regional coordination should make that answer stronger.